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INSIDER TRANSACTIONS

Court follow the lead in Martin is yet to be seen. It is hoped that
neither the technical requirement of McNally that petitioner be released from physical custody, nor the states' discretionary power to
deny parole or retry petitioner, will be utilized as a jurisdictional
barrier to prevent federal district courts from determining the
validity of sentences to be served in the future.
C.

RALPH KINSEY, JR.

Corporations-"Profit Realized" In Section 16(b)Insider Transactions
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., owner of more than ten per cent of the
stock of the plaintiff corporation, bought 32,000 additional shares
for a Gamble-Skogmo employees' trust fund.' Only 25,942 of those
shares were transferred to the fund, however, and the remaining
shares were retained by the purchaser. Within six months of this
purchase, Gamble-Skogmo sold' all of its stock in the plaintiff except that held by the trust fund. Plaintiff sought recovery of
Gamble-Skogmo's "profits" on all 32,000 shares under section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 Only the profit made on
the 6,058 retained shares was paid, and plaintiff sued for the profits4 that would have been realized had the 25,942 shares in the
trust fund been included in the short-swing transaction. The district
'Gamble-Skogmo was not required to make its contribution to the trust
fund in Western Auto stock, or in any other stock for that matter. Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
United States
2 The sale was pursuant to an antitrust consent decree.
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., Civil No. 12776, W.D. Mo., July 18, 1960.
"48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See 44 N.C.L. REv.
835 n.3 (1966) for the full text of the statute. See generally 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1040-90 (2d ed. 1961); Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958) ; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Recurities Exchange Act (pts. 1 & 2), 66
HARv. L. Rv. 385, 612 (1963); Painter, The Evolving Role of Section
16(b), 62 MIcH. L. REv. 649 (1964); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 468 (1947). At the time their articles were written, Mr. Cook was
Chairman, and Mr. Feldman, Special Council, of the Securities and Ex-

change Commission, though they did not purport to be speaking on behalf
of the Commission.
'The profit was calculated at $3.65 per share, a total of $116,800.00,
based on the difference between the price per share paid for the 32,000
shares and the price per share received when all 1,262,102 shares were sold.
Also, two dividends of $.35 per share, paid on the stock before the shortswing sale, were included,
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but in Western Aueto Supply

Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.' the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff should
recover profits, realized or not, on all 32,000 shares.
Under section 16 (b) liability is based upon an objective measure
of proof.7 A plaintiff need only show that the "insider" ' traded in
his company's stock within a six-month period. A showing of actual unfair use of inside information is not necessary,9 and the good
faith or intention motivating the insider's trading is irrelevant. 10
Since the statute does not prohibit insider trading, 1 it is meant
to be broadly construed by the courts so as to have a prophylactic
effect. 2 At the same time, section 16(b) makes an insider liable
only for "any profit realized"'- by him on his short-swing transactions. However, neither "profit" nor "realized" is defined in the
statute or in the rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since in the ordinary violation the "profit realized" is
simply the difference between the sale price and the purchase price,
'Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 456
(D. Minn. 1964).
'348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
This was a two-to-one decision.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

320 U.S. 751 (1943).
'An "insider" is a director, officer, or a stockholder owning 109 or
more of the stock of the corporation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

§ 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).

'It has been suggested that the preamble of § 16(b), which refers to
this, was intended merely as an aid to constitutionality and a guide to the

SEC in the exercise of its rule-making authority. Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).

However, while actual motive is irrelevant, the absence of any possibility of
improper motive has sometimes been considered relevant by the courts in
determining whether a conversion or reclassification of securities involved
a "purchase" or "sale." 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1041 n.14.
"0Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1964); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961);

Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403
(1962) ; Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra
note 9, at 235.

" As originally drafted, § 16(b) was to have been a complete prohibi-

tion against any insider trading, and criminal penalties were to attach to
any of its violations. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6430
(1934).
" Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962).
1848 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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only one court has had occasion thus far to consider what should
be the definition of "any profit realized":
[W]e think it is clear that Congress intended that ordinarily
no gain in the value of securities should be deemed to be realized
as a profit under the Act until there had been a definitive act by
the owner of the securities whereby the paper value of the securities has become a real and includible one .... 15
In Gamble-Skogmo there was likewise only a paper profit made
on the 25,942 trust fund shares. Consequently it would seem that
the court should have affirmed the decision that only the profit
admittedly made on the 6,058 shares was recoverable. While those
shares were purchased at the same time as the others, they were
never transferred to the fund. Instead, they were retained by
Gamble-Skogmo and sold along with its earlier-acquired stock less
than six months later at a higher price. Although it is not clear in
either the opinions or the briefs what the exact relationship of the
trust fund to the corporation was, two arguments support the position of this note that no recoverable profit was made on the 25,942
shares.
The Eighth Circuit apparently felt that the trust fund was not
enough a separate entity for the corporation to have lost any real
control over the shares of stock transferred to the fund. 6 Therefore, it reasoned that because Gamble-Skogmo within a six-month
period had purchased a certain number of shares at one price and
had sold an equivalent number of shares at a higher price when it
disposed of its entire holding, a recoverable profit could be imputed
1,Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), 44 N.C.L.
REv. 835 (1966). The term "any profit realized" has been considered
indirectly, however, in two cases dealing with an investment banking house's
partners who were sitting on the board of directors of the issuing corpora-

tions at the time of the partnership's short-swing transactions. In Rattner
v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952), the court concluded that the partner

was liable only for his distributive share of the profits since "under a
literal reading of the statute he cannot be held liable for profits 'realized'
by other partners from the firm's short swing transactions." 193 F.2d at
565. In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the only Supreme Court
case interpreting § 16(b), the Court reached a similar conclusion based on

Rattizer.

1 352 F.2d at 167. This definition has been quoted subsequently in
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 19, in Blan v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp.
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), now on appeal before the Second Circuit.
'oThe court of appeals, contrary to the district court, held that dividends
received on the 25,942 shares in the trust fund were recoverable by plaintiff.
348 F.2d at 744. This might lend strength to the implication that the court of
appeals felt that the trust fund was indistinguishable from the corporation.
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to the 25,942 shares. The court said that section 16(b) required
that purchases and sales be matched arbitrarily so as to disgorge
the insider of his maximum profit, regardless of the insider's intent
or the time when the stock was purchased.' 7 This was based on the
widely accepted rule of the leading case of Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp.'8 There the insiders argued that the sales of the shares involved were made from a backlog of stock they had kept longer
than six months. Stressing that the object of the statute was "to
squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions,"'" the court
rejected the insiders' argument 0 that they be allowed to match
stock certificates and held that the only rule whereby all possible
profits could surely be recovered was that of "lowest price in, highest price out" within six months.2 '
Although the corporation in effect sought to match certificates
in opposition to the Smolowe rule, the facts of Gamble-Skogmno
seem sufficiently distinguishable to warrant segregation of shares.
Had Smolowe permitted matching of certificates, the insiders would
have retained measurable profits in violation of the spirit if not the
letter of section -16(b). Such a holding would also violate the concept of shares as fungibles.22 Unlike the insiders in Smolowe,
Gamble-Skogmo's earlier acquired interest in the plaintiff was not
being used as a backlog of stock to evade the statute by speculating
in plaintiff's stock. Since the Sinolowe rule contemplates an arbi348 F.2d at 743.
136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
1d. at 239.
20 The insiders argued for the "identity of shares" theory or its corollary,
the "first-in, first-out" rule, both borrowed from the tax field. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1012-1 (c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6837, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 31, at 13. They also argued for the striking of an average purchase
and sale price, but the court rejected that argument, too, because allowing
losses to offset profits would encourage more, not less, insider trading. 136
F.2d at 239. The harshness of the lowest-price-in, highest-price-out rule may
be seen by Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 920 (1951), which reasserted the Svnolowe doctrine after an independent analysis. There the court assessed a judgment of $300,000 against the
defendant for his insider "profits," although his trading in the stock had
resulted in an actual loss of over $400,000.
21 The lowest-price-in, highest-price-out test had been specifically included
in the original drafts of § 16(b) and deleted without explanation. S. 2693
and H.R. 7852, § 15(b) (1), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). For an explanation of the way in which the test is meant to be applied, see 2 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 1062-66.
2 Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951).
18
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trary matching of purchases and sales, it should not be blindly applied in every case. To apply it here would be to penalize GambleSkogmo for a profit as yet unrealized. Until such time as the 25,942
shares in the trust fund are sold, their appreciation, as measured by
the difference between what Gamble-Skogmo paid for the stock and
what it received from the sale of its other stock, is merely a paper
profit. Section 16(b) neither prevents an insider from investing
in his company's stock nor penalizes him for using inside information to speculate if the trading is done at six-month intervals.
Furthermore, the court's fear that the policy of section 16(b)
would be frustrated by permitting Gamble-Skogmo's defense of
segregating shares appears groundless. The statute has not been
applied as arbitrarily as the language of the opinions might suggest.23 For example, conflicting results2" in applying the term "purchase and sale"' to various transactions indicate that most of those
decisions have been rendered on an ad hoc basis. It has been said
that while not doing violence to the supposedly "objective" thrust
of the statute, the courts have inferred that Congress did not intend
the application of section 16(b) to be purely mechanical and automatic in every respect.2"
The district court, on the other hand, apparently felt that the
trust fund was distinct from the corporation.1 Thus, at the time
Gamble-Skogmo sold all of its interest in the plaintiff, it had no claim
to the 25,942 shares, which had already passed into the assets of the
trust fund some five months earlier. This would be a distinguishing
"See, e.g., Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
2 Compare Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (exercise of stock options a "purchase"); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (conversion of preferred stock into common
a "purchase"); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (receipt of stock pursuant to corporate liquidation a
"purchase"), with Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 827 (1954) (receipt of stock in reclassification not a "purchase");
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (acquisition of stock under
option contract not a "purchase"); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (receipt of rights distributed to
all stockholders proportionately not a "purchase").
2r48
Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2
Painter, supra note 3, at 665.
231 F. Supp. at 461. Letter From Edward J. Callahan, Jr., Counsel
for Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., to the writer, April 12, 1966, on file with the
North CarolinaLaw Review, states that the trust fund "was a wholly separate
entity... and no one at Gamble-Skogmo had any position with it nor control
over it."
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feature from the Smolowe-type cases 28 where the insiders still held
other stock of the issuer but argued that those shares were of stock
acquired more than six months before the sale in question. The
"undeniable fact"2 to the district court was that there was no "purchase" of the stock on Gamble-Skogmo's part. Rather, the corporation had acted simply as a "conduit" through which the shares
destined for the trust fund passed." Accordingly, this transfer of
stock was not a short-swing transaction. Furthermore, since Gamble-Skogmo delivered the stock to the trust fund at the same price it
paid for it,3 1 no profit inured to Gamble-Skogmo on the transfer
and the whole transaction was the same as if Gamble-Skogmo had
made a voluntary gift of the stock to the fund.8"
While the district court was obviously trying to avoid the "purposeless harshness"' 3 of section 16(b), it would have been more
" See, e.g., Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp.

702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

" 231 F. Supp. at 461.
" Ibid. The district court's argument was accepted by the dissenting
judge in the court of appeals. 348 F.2d at 745 (dissenting opinion). Although the SEC argued that the district court's conclusion that GambleSkogmo acted as a "conduit" for the purpose of making the purchase for
the trust fund "appears to be without support," it conceded that if GambleSkogmo had acted "solely as agent for the trust fund, the trial court's result
might have been reached without endangering the principles which we feel
must not be impaired." Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 13 n.16,
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966). But, quaere whether the abuse
of inside information would be any the less in one situation than in the other.
1 Had Gamble-Skogmo actually sold the 25,942 shares on the market
on the day of the transfer, it would have sustained a loss of $.60 per share.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1960, p. 18, col. 6.
" Compare the two so-called "gift" cases cited by the district court,
Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949),
and Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), where it
was held that the making of gifts of warrants or the shares purchased on
exercise of the warrants was no violation of § 16(b). The reasoning in
both cases was placed on the ground that no profit had been realized by the
insiders. In Truncale the SEC in its amicus curiae brief specifically argued
for the theory that there had beer no "profit realized" by the insider, rather
than that there had been no "sale." 80 F. Supp. at 391. But, quaere whether
the making of a gift of appreciated securities is not an economic benefit
equal to a profit to the insider, either in terms of taxes, prestige in the
community, or recompense for personal services. See Shaw v. Dreyfus,
supra at 143 (dissenting opinion by Clark, J.). The court of appeals in
Gamble-Skognto sought to distinguish these two cases on the basis that they
both dealt with bona fide gifts and that neither involved a sale within six
months of the gift. 348 F.2d at 743 n.7.
3
Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965).
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reasonable if the court had held that the acquisition and transfer
of the 25,942 shares were a "purchase" and "sale" by GambleSkogmo which resulted in a technical violation of the statute.3 4 But,
since no profit was realized on the transaction, there was nothing
the plaintiff could recover. Again, the only recoverable profit would
be on the 6,058 shares that were retained by Gamble-Skogmo and
later sold.
It is unfortunate that both of the courts in Gamble-Skogmo
failed to express clearly their concept of the trust fund's relationship to the corporation. Nevertheless, whether the trust fund be
considered separate from or part of the corporation, there seemingly
was no "profit realized" by Gamble-Skogmo on the 25,942 trust
fund shares. Therefore, it is submitted that a correct application
of the statute in this case should have allowed plaintiff to recover
only the profit made on the 6,058 shares actually involved in the
short-swing transaction.
F. LEE LIEBOLT,
JR.*

Corporations-Section 16(b) Liability-Conversion
Transactions by Insiders
In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has taken a novel approach to certain
questions concerning liability under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.2 Defendant Webster, a director of Heli-Coil Corporation,
purchased a quantity of the corporation's callable debentures, which
were convertible into common stock any time before redemption or
maturity. Within six months of the purchase of the debentures,
Webster converted, exchanging the- bonds for 3,600 shares of common stock, and within .six months of conversion, he sold 1,300
shares of the Heli-Coil common. There had been no call oh the
debentures. The corporation brought suit to -recover short-swing
profits under the provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.3 The district court held that the conversion of the
'Cf. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
'352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
* Student

8 (b)

For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information

which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or

